The objective of the paper is to analyze the Central European Free Trade Agreement 2006 (CEFTA-2006) impact on trade and provide quantitative comparison with the original CEFTA and with the trade liberalization under the EU integration process. The paper belongs to the strand of the literature analyzing a free trade agreement in a gravity framework, but treating it as being potentially endogenous. We argue that, for the case of CEFTA-2006, not only the economic similarity and geographical proximity forced countries to self-select into a free trade agreement, but also that their will to join EU as soon as possible and, in that way, to prevent further conflicts in the Balkans, acted as a crucial spiritus movens to engage into a free trade agreement. The empirical evidence suggests that CEFTA-2006 exerted positive, significant and large effect on trade in South-East Europe. This finding can be largely attributed to the distracted trade flows in the region over the 1990s, given it was a decade of wars, embargoes, hyperinflation and social unrest. The effect of CEFTA-2006 has been estimated to be larger than the effect of the Stabilization and Association Agreements, which counteracts the concern that the European Union and the South-Eastern European countries formed a 'hub-and-spoke' structure in terms of trade. Findings also suggest that CEFTA-2006 in South-East Europe exerted considerably larger influence on trade than the original CEFTA in Central Europe.
Introduction
In 2006 regional trade of the South-East European (SEE) countries, so that they will be able to cope with the competitive pressure once they become a part of the EU single market. However, CEFTA-2006 has been still a response to some fears (Baldwin, 1994 ) that the EU accession will divert SEE's export to the EU and render SEE countries more vulnerable to shocks coming from the EU. Hence, CEFTA-2006 started operating with two basic objectives: i) it had to test the SEE's capacity to work together within a regional agreement and build their competitiveness;
and ii) it had to oppose the growing dependence of these countries on the trade with the EU by re-establishing the regional market. However, bringing SEE countries under single umbrella has likely political side also: working together would enable those countries to join the EU faster and hence prevent further political tensions and conflicts in the Balkan, which earmarked the last decade of the XX century.
The objective of the paper is to analyze CEFTA-2006 impact on trade and provide quantitative comparison with the original CEFTA and with the trade liberalization under the EU integration process. The paper belongs to the strand of the literature analyzing a free trade agreement in a gravity framework, but treating it as being potentially endogenous. We argue that, for the case of CEFTA-2006, not only the economic similarity and geographical proximity forced countries to self-select into a free trade agreement, but also that their will to join EU as soon as possible and, in that way, to prevent further conflicts in the Balkans, acted as a crucial spiritus movens to engage into a free trade agreement. In econometric terms, the former causes CEFTA-2006 endogeneity due to observables, while the latter due to unobservables, and both require comprehensive treatment in an empirical analysis. Quantifying and comparing CEFTA-2006 impact on trade and treating it as endogenous creation has not been done so far and this is the main contribution to knowledge the present paper makes.
How effective has CEFTA-2006 been so far? Findings suggest that, having controlled for countries' income and other characteristics, the agreement exerted a large effect on trade in the magnitude of about seven to eight times higher trade due to the agreement compared to the period over the 1990s and to the countries outside of it. This finding can be largely attributed to the distracted trade flows of the SEEs over the 1990s, given it was a decade of wars, embargoes, hyperinflation and social unrest. The effect of CEFTA-2006 has been estimated to be larger than the effect of the Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA), which counteracts the concern that EU and SEEs formed a 'hub-and-spoke' structure in terms of trade. The original CEFTA effect has been found significant and positive, while EUROPA Agreements likely did not exert influence on CEEs trade. Hence, EU's trade approach has not been in favor of a 'hub-and-spoke' structure in the CEE as well.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives some intuition and motivation for the investigated issue. Section 3 sets the model and reviews the literature. Section 4 explains the data issues and the methodology used, with special attention to how potential endogeneity is addressed. Section 5 presents the results and offers discussion. Section 6 concludes. Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo (the then Serbia) and has close ethnic ties with the citizens in those countries. In the whole group, only Moldova is distant from all countries, both physically and in terms of cultural similarity.
Trade Developments
Yugoslavia dissolved in 1990 and its republics begun the stiff road toward political pluralism and market economy. The first years of transition were marked by many political shocks: the military conflict in Croatia, the war in Bosnia, the UN embargo and NATO intervention in Serbia and the subsequent refugees' crisis, the internal conflict in Macedonia, all these coupled with hard structural reforms, including the long process of privatization of the state capital. In economic terms, this resulted in a loss of the traditional markets, in erecting physical borders and trade barriers among the republics and halting the trade with the eastern bloc, which was then traditional trading partner. Many firms, in the hands of the new owners, had difficulties to reorient their export, which reflected into further deterioration of product competitiveness and ultimately resulted in declining production and firms' bankruptcy. As 
Source: IMF DOTS
Given the political developments in the region during the 1990s, the European Union raised an initiative in 1999 to form the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, as an institution aimed at strengthening peace, democracy, human rights and economy in SEE. In the economic area, the Pact was promoting, inter alia, the intensified trade cooperation among the SEE countries, which led to the signing of several bilateral free trade agreements and the Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) of those countries with the EU (see Table 1 ).
SAA envisaged, inter alia, a gradual reduction of tariffs between those countries and the EU in an asymmetric manner, hence contributing to expanding the trade between these countries and the EU. Hence, while the bilateral FTAs were aimed to spur the bilateral (and, indirectly, the intraregional) trade, the SAA process was designed to support the trade between SEE countries and the EU. Table 1 ), but the relative importance of the EU trade for the bloc has not changed. 
Source: Author's calculations based on IMF DOTS
On the other hand, over the same period of time, trade with the EU-15 and the original CEFTA increased, but more moderately. In the last column of Table 2 , the factor increases with
Ukraine and Russia are given (two large neighboring countries of the CEFTA-2006 bloc).
Majority of the CEFTA-2006 countries do not have a FTA with these two countries. As we will explain later, these will mainly serve for cross-section comparability. The trade increase there is poor, which might suggest that indeed CEFTA-2006 played a market unifying role and that results are likely not driven by a general economic trend.
Literature Review

The Research on CEFTA 2006
In spite of the trade-related developments in South-Eastern Europe over the past decade 
The Gravity model and an Indicative Review of the Effect of FTAs on Trade
The Gravity model used in social sciences is a modified version of the Isaac Newton Law of Gravitation. It has been consistently used in modeling bilateral international trade flows and is usually referred to as a 'workhorse for empirical studies' (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007) , although it can be used to predict other flows, as well, such as flows of migration and foreign direct investment, people, information and so on (Martinoz-Zarzoso, 2003) . The renewed attention to the theoretical foundations of gravity equations has resulted in formulations of the gravity equations that derive from general equilibrium modeling of bilateral trade patterns (Feenstra, 2002; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003) . In its simplest and conventional form, the gravity model estimates bilateral trade flows as a function of the income levels (GDP expressed in nominal terms) and the distance between the two trading partners. Domestic income level approximates supply and is assumed to push export, while the foreign income approximates demand and is assumed to pull export. Distance between the capital cities is used as a proxy for transportation costs and hence is considered as trade resisting factor ).
Besides the above variables, the empirical specifications of the gravity model typically include (dummy) variables that support or reduce trade between two countries, such as common border, common language, land areas, cultural similarity, geographical position, historical links, and preferential trade arrangements. These variables tend to affect the transaction costs relevant for bilateral trade and have proven to be statistically significant determinants of trade in various empirical applications (Anderson, 1979; Helpman and Krugman, 1985) . The Linder effect might also be incorporated in the model, meaning that countries on a similar development level (GDPs per capita) will trade more. This effect is usually captured through a dummy variable that measures absolute difference between per capita incomes of the trading partners. The special consideration of all these variables will provide important insights on the various aspects contributing to the decision to join an FTA as CEFTA 2006 is. In addition to such conventional gravity models, generalized gravity models include price and exchange rate variables (Pugh and Tyrrall, 2000; Micco et al. 2003; Graham et al. 2004 ).
The omitted variable of great concern is termed 'multilateral resistance' and is emphasized in the theoretical foundation of the gravity model (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Frankel, 2008; Feenstra, 2002) . These effects are defined as a function of unobservable equilibrium results have been mixed, at best. Aitken (1973) , Abrams (1980) , and Brada and Mendez (1983) found the European Community (EC) having an economically and statistically significant effect on trade flows among members, whereas Bergstrand (1985) and Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) found insignificant effects. Frankel (1997) found positive significant effects from Mercosur, insignificant effects from the Andean Pact, and significant negative effects from membership in the EC. Other studies have had similar seemingly implausible results; Frankel (1997) and Oguledo and MacPhee (1994) provide summaries of FTA coefficient estimates across studies.
'Endogenising' the Trade Agreement in a Gravity Equation
One of the main critiques of the studies using gravity model to predict the effect of FTAs on international trade flows is related to causality, i.e. the endogeneity of the choice over the trading partner(s) with whom a country signs an FTA, which is usually (and 'naturally') biased towards the neighbors. Hence, if FTA dummy is not treated as endogenous; biased and inconsistent results arise from the unobservable heterogeneity and/or omitted variables (Caporale et al. 2008; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007) . Above reviewed studies all treat the FTA variable as exogenous. A strand of the literature emerged in the gravity analysis, treating the FTA variable as potentially endogenous.
Controlling for the endogeneity through using differentiated panel data, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) , for instance, found that traditional estimates of the effect of FTAs on trade flows underestimated the effect by 75-85%; results are biased downwards which explains the rather weak empirical support or low estimates of the effect. Trefler (1993) addressed systematically the simultaneous determination of U.S. multilateral imports and U.S. multilateral nontariff barriers in a cross-industry analysis. Using instrumental variables, Trefler (1993) found that after accounting for the endogeneity of trade policies, the effect of these policies on U.S.
imports increased tenfold. Lee and Swagel (1997) also showed using instrumental variables that previous estimates of the impact of trade liberalization on imports had been considerably underestimated. In addition, Frankel (2008) argues that FTA's endogeneity might be more important for developing countries.
Having considered all important aspects of an FTA effects analysis, we proceed by defining the estimable model and propose a strategy to resolve the raised estimation issues.
Methodology and Data
Methodological Issues
Given the issues discussed in section 3, we employ the following model:
Whereby: is the log of the real bilateral trade (the log of export plus import) between i and j at time t; is the log of the sum of the real GDP per head in country i and country j at time t;
is the log of the distance between i and j; reflects the cultural, historical and political factors affecting bilateral trade between two countries. This vector includes the following three dummy variables: common language; common border; being a part of same state in the past.
is the real bilateral exchange rate between i and j (obtained as the log of the nominal exchange rate plus the log of foreign price level minus the log of the domestic price level). is the within-quarter standard deviation of the log changes of the bilateral nominal exchange rate.
As argued earlier, the real bilateral exchange rate reflects competitiveness, while the standard deviation of the nominal rate reflects the uncertainty in the economy imposed from the exchange rate. Higher variability is expected to deter traders, in general, although some papers (Pugh and Tyrrall, 2000) use the low risk aversion as argument to trade more when the rate is more volatile. is the country i's GDP divided by county j's GDP, to capture Linder's (1961) hypothesis that countries with similar demand patterns are likely to trade more. and are dummy variables that take value of 1 for all pairs in the years after country i The latter is impossible to do for the original CEFTA, given that the dataset starts in 1993, the same year when CEFTA started its operation. is the time-specific fixed effect which control for global trends and shocks, but also global changes in transportation and communication costs. is an i.i.d error term which is assumed to be well-behaved.
Estimating (1) faces some econometric challenges. Firstly, many studies employ either a cross-section or a pooled OLS specification and they often ignore country heterogeneity altogether. However, the failure to account for this might lead biased results (see, for instance, Serlenga and Shin, 2004, and Cheng and Wall, 2005 , for a documentation of this). As argued earlier, this has been addressed in the recent literature, by the inclusion of the multilateral trade resistance term, covered by fixed effects (see section 3.2). In addition, later research suggested that instead of using simple fixed effects, individual country-pair dummies should be included to get efficient estimators (see, e.g. Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2003) . Hence, in (1) is the countrypair individual effects covering all unobservable factors related to trade resistance, including tariff and non-tariff barriers, geographical position, trade openness and so on.
Secondly, a problem that arises from the first one is that we will not be able to obtain separate estimates for the coefficients of and in (1), given these, as time-invariant variables, are collinear with the country-pair fixed effects. To resolve this issue, we will follow and approach present in the literature (Cheng and Wall, 2005; Bussière et al. 2005) and estimate an additional regression of the country-pair fixed effects on the time-invariant variables in order to filter out the importance of these variables in the fixed effect:
Thirdly and mostly importantly for this investigation, as argued in section 3.3, a FTA likely suffers endogeneity; in addition, other right-hand variables cannot be said to be exogenous. For instance, domestic GDP and trade are endogenously determined. What is more important here, CEFTA 2006, may also be an endogenous process. Namely, the formation of FTAs is usually (and 'naturally') biased towards the neighbours (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007) and/or among countries that have already had strong trade relationships before. Some papers (Micco et al. 2003; Cheng and Wall, 2005; Bussière et al. 2005) argue that the inclusion of the country-pair fixed effects will resolve this issue also. The intuition is that fixed effects take into account whether the pair of countries has had higher trade in the past. However, this will not capture endogeneity emulating from another source -forming an FTA between neighbours which have not necessarily traded a lot in the past, but they share some common vision to establish an FTA as a precondition for entering some larger union. This is indeed the case of CEFTA However, we argued in sections 3.3 and 4.1 how the exogeneity assumption in our case may be violated. Countries might be prone to sign FTAs with their neighbours. Certainly, this is a likely assumption for all CEFTA, CEFTA 2006, EUROPA and SSA. In econometric terms, the selection bias arises when the treatment is correlated with the error. To overcome this potential endogenous treatment, we need to introduce in the equation all observable variables that could be possibly correlated with the error term, but also determine bilateral trade flows. By doing so, the observed information contained in all exogenous and variables related to the treatment will remove any correlation between trade and FTAs. This so-called selection by observables will eliminate any endogeneity of the treatment coming from observable information (see further in Barnow et al. 1980; Heckman and Hotz, 1989; and Moffitt, 1996) . The variables about the income of the pair of countries, as well as the dummies like distance, common language, common border and so on, are variables that 'endogenize' the FTA variable and they enter the equation.
However, the error term may still be different from zero if there are common unobservable factors that affect both FTAs and the error term, in which case the treatment is still endogenous.
If there exists only a component of the vector of variables to determine FTAs, then it may be used as an instrumental variable to correct the endogeneity of FTAs (because it is correlated with FTAs but not with the trade flows, except through FTAs). According to Wooldridge (2002, pp.621) , this means that this component of the vector will not appear in the treatment regression
(1), because it affects trade only indirectly; this is the part of the identification to overcome endogeneity stemming from the selection of unobservables and it can be tested only indirectly through an over-identification test. Note that it is reasonable to believe that the endogeneity of SSA and EUROPA will be captured by the selection of observables, given that the engine of these creations is the dependence of the emerging markets from the EU demand, as well they being in the EU neighbourhood. Both incomes and distance already enter the regression.
However, in the case of CEFTA and CEFTA-2006, there has been another engine of the regional integration. Namely, these countries are undeniably willing to join the EU. In order to be prepared to face the competitive pressure on the single market, EU favors that they form a regional trade bloc before entering the common market. "More recently, the prospect of the EU membership might have given a new impetus to these dynamics." (Bussiere et al. 2005, p.11) .
Hence, we need some instrument to capture this source of endogeneity. The optimal instrumental variable would be the one which best mimics these-countries' will to join the EU as soon as possible. However, such variable can be hardly approximated All remaining estimates are obtained with the GMM estimator (Staiger and Stock, 1997) , by using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation corrected (h.a.c) standard errors 2 . Therein, the GDP variable is treated as potentially endogenous and is instrumented by its own lags. In column (3), CEFTA and CEFTA-2006 are instrumented by the indices of political rights and civil liberties, to address the potential endogeneity stemming from unobservables (as argued in the methodological section). However, despite the argumentation that the original CEFTA is also an endogenous creation, the appropriate test does not reject the null of its exogeneity (last row in Table 3 ). This might be due to the fact that at least the core members of CEFTA (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) signed this agreement subsequently to the dissolution of the CMEA whereby they exercised considerable economic cooperation under the umbrella of the Soviet Union. Hence, it is likely that geographical proximity and the established trade ties governed the creation of CEFTA, and not, like in the case of CEFTA-2006, the will to join the EU. "While the transition [from CMEA to CEFTA] led to a sharp fall in regional trade, it had also opened up the possibility of EU accession. However, the EU member states were wary of the idea of an eastern enlargement." (Adam et al. 2003, p.5) . So, the optimism of those countries at this stage has been likely subdued. Moreover, a couple of years after the establishment, CEFTA's proliferation was steered by the EU insistence to counteract forming a hub-and-spoke structure with the EUROPA Agreements, and not the opposite, which further argues in favor of CEFTA being less endogenous creation than CEFTA-2006 (Adam et al. 2003 .
Results and Discussion
The subsequent columns in Table 3 include the real bilateral exchange rate, the nominal exchange rate volatility and the relative GDP of the countries i and j, and all intend to serve as robustness checks. In all of them, CEFTA is treated as being exogenous. All specifications are correctly specified, according to the relevant tests for model's and instruments' identification. In all cases, the exogeneity of the income and CEFTA-2006 has been rejected. This is in line with the discussion that in the case of CEFTA-2006, an important engine of its creation has also been the will of these countries to join the EU as soon as possible and hence eliminate the risk of falling into political and military problems again. (p-val) 0.4901 *,** and *** refer to statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. ‡ and † refer to the test statistic being below 5 and 10%, respectively, the maximal IV relative bias. Variables in italics are the outcome of the second stage regression.
Countries' income positively and significantly affects trade in about proportional manner.
The variables in italic are obtained in the second step (see equation [2] in Section 4.1), and they have plausible coefficients, suggesting a trade decline by about 0.2% with an additional 1% increase of distance and a trade increase by 5.2% and 2.8% when countries i and j share a border or a state in the past, respectively. Sharing the language does not affect bilateral trade significantly. Depreciation of the real bilateral exchange rate, i.e. improving competitiveness by 1%, increases trade, on average, by 2%, while nominal rate volatility is found insignificant. The latter could be due to the dominance of rigid forms of the exchange rate across the sample. The more countries are similar, the more they trade (the Linder effect): if the relative GDP coefficient increases by 1 unit (i.e. country i is double the size of country j), then trade is predicted to be lower by about 11.5%.
All trade agreements' effects have been captured by dummy variables с bolded in Table 3 for visibility. These account for the deviation of the normal trade patterns. We should be cautious with the interpretation of their coefficients, given that they are in front of a dummy variable in a semi-log regression. Kennedy (1981) 3 suggests that in such cases, the correct estimate is not
The variable of our main interest, CEFTA-2006, is positive and significant. The calculation of the correct coefficient suggests that CEFTA-2006 increased trade in SEE by 7 to 8 times, on average. At first glance, this is implausibly large magnitude of the effect. Given that we also control for any bilateral agreements that existed before, this coefficient compares with the period before these agreements, i.e. over 1990s. Indeed, when one looks in the actual factor increase in Table 2 , then the large magnitudes of increase become reasonable and can be largely attributed to the very low level of intra-regional trade in the 1990, due to the many conflicts, embargos and inter-ethnic intolerance. Our finding suggests that a major part of this increase can be attributed to the CEFTA-2006. Also, the variable for other FTAs (bilateral agreements before CEFTA-2006) is significant and with large coefficient, suggesting that these agreements increased trade in SEE by about 2.5 times. The results are supported by the findings of an earlier study on trade in SEE (Christie, 2002) that there has been no clear economic block in SEE over the 1990s. However, note that the estimates are larger than the actual average increases in Table 2 . This is due to the both time and cross-section comparability of our estimates -they compare to the period before, but also to countries with which the CEFTA-2006 countries have no trade agreements, like Russia and Ukraine. Indeed, Table 2 In parallel to this process, the SAA process has been found to have played role in SEE, increasing trade by about 20%, on average. This increase is considerably lower than the one attained by CEFTA-2006, counteracting EU's concerns that SEEs would form a 'hub-and-spoke' structure with the EU in terms of trade. Results suggest quite the contrary -these countries were capable of forming a strong hub among themselves, but preserving the significance of the EU as a trading partner. In this respect, CEFTA-2006 has been a necessary condition for a welfare gains from the SAA.
The trade effect of the original CEFTA has been estimated to be significant, but with considerably lower magnitude than that of CEFTA-2006 . Results suggest that the original CEFTA increased trade in CEE by about 12%, on average. The coefficient is in line with the findings of other studies (e.g., Bussiere et al. 2005; De Benedictis et al. 2005) . The coefficient on the EUROPA Agreements is found insignificant, as in De Benedictis et al. (2005) . The latter can be explained by the fact that starting from the 1980s, trade between CEEs and EU15 was already intense because reduction of the trade barriers had already taken place. This view is in line with the many contributions that emphasized the erosion in the unrealized trade potential of the CEEs with the EU15 already in the early 1990s. Hence, the significance of CEFTA and the insignificance of the EUROPA Agreements also counteract the concern that CEEs formed a 'hub-and-spoke' structure with the EU in terms of trade. Finally, belonging to the EU spurs trade by less than half, as expected.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
The given it was a decade of wars, embargoes, hyperinflation and social unrest.
The success of CEFTA-2006, no matter the comparative context, brings an important lesson for the SEEs. It suggests that if they want to work together with a big light-motivejoining the European family с they can achieve a lot. On this road, increasing the further cooperation с reducing the non-tariff barriers to trade, coordination in the process of attraction of
